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 The paper explains that the Russian gas giant, Gazprom, has failed to invest 
adequately, resulting in very little development of new gas supplies in Russia. The result 
has been progressively increasing use by Gazprom of central Asian gas supplies, at 
progressively higher prices for Russia. The increased prices of gas for Russian consumers 
have shown that it is crucial for Russian welfare to allow new entrants, and to introduce 
competition in the Russian domestic market. Competition among multiple gas suppliers 
from Russia, however, would erode or eliminate the monopoly profits of the Russian 
Federation on gas exports. Thus, with a more competitive domestic market, the Russian 
government would be expected to grant exclusive exporting rights to a single entity (as it 
presently does with Gazprom) or impose export taxes. Thus, Europe should not expect to 
achieve cheaper Russian gas as a result of structural reforms within the Russian gas 
market. More promising avenues for European energy diversification are new pipeline 
construction to open up new sources of supply independent of Russia (especially the 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
  During the negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the Russian 
Federation on Russia’s bilateral market access agreement with the EU for accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the EU pressed Russia to charge the same price 
for the exports of its natural gas as it charges in its domestic industrial consumers. The 
Russian Federation grants an export monopoly to Gazprom, allowing Gazprom to charge 
profit maximizing prices on its exports. The domestic price of natural gas, however, is 
regulated by the Russian Federation, resulting in dual pricing of natural gas, where export 
prices have far exceeded domestic prices in Russia. This issue was bitterly controversial 
in Russia, and then President Vladimir Putin declared that Russia would not join the 
WTO if forced to unify its gas prices. In a paper that reportedly was highly influential in 
resolving this dispute, Peter Thomson and I (Tarr and Thomson, 2004), concluded that it 
was in Russia’s interest to exploit its monopoly power on gas sales in Europe—this 
implies that dual pricing of natural gas was in Russia’s interest. We estimated Russia 
gained substantially from dual pricing—by about two percent per year of its GDP.  
  As part of its strategy to diversify its energy sources, the European Union has sought 
competition in the Russian natural gas market. This has also been a long standing 
recommendation of the World Bank.
1  Due to the very low level of investment by 
Gazprom and resulting lack of development of new gas supplies, the introduction of 
competition in the Russian market has become even more crucial during the past decade. 
Due to lack of supplies, Gazprom is relying increasingly on purchases of central Asian 
gas supplies, at ever increasing prices. Ironically, after winning its bitter battle for the 
right to impose dual pricing of natural gas, the Russian Federation has announced plans 
to raise prices to its domestic industrial users to European levels in 2011, less 
transportation costs and export taxes.  
Competition among multiple gas suppliers from Russia would erode or eliminate the 
monopoly profits of the Russian Federation on gas exports. Thus, if competition were 
introduced, the Russian government would be expected to grant exclusive exporting 
                                                 
1 See, e.g.,  Tarr and Thomson (2004) and the European Commission (2006).  .  
2 
 rights to a single entity (as it presently does with Gazprom) or impose export taxes. This, 
Europe should not expect to achieve cheaper Russian gas though competition within 
Russia. A more promising avenue for European energy diversification is new pipeline 
construction to open up new sources of supply independent of Russia (especially the 
Nabucco and Trans- Caspian pipelines) and liquefied natural gas purchases.
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II. Optimal Export Prices 
 
Russia’s proved natural gas reserves at the end of 2008 were 43.3 trillion cubic 
meters, which constitute 23.4 percent of the world’s proven reserves.
3  Its 2008 
production of 602 billion cubic meters (BCM) constituted 19.6 percent of world 
production. Its reserves to production ratio in 2008 of 72 years, is higher than any other 
significant producer except Saudi Arabia.  Russia is also by far the world’s largest 
exporter of natural gas.  In 2008, Gazprom exported about 154 BCM to Europe 
(including Turkey). Russia, in 2008, had a market share of approximately 28 percent of 
natural gas sales in Europe.  In the year 2008, Europe including Turkey consumed about 
547 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas, while importing 154 BCM from Russia.
   
It is in Russia’s interest to try to maximize its profits from exports of natural gas.  
Given the need to ship natural gas from Russia to Europe through a pipeline, Russia is 
able to “segment” the European market from the Russian market, and competes in Europe 
only with pipeline supplied gas subject to an upper limit on its price equal to the price of 
delivered liquefied natural gas. The Russian government has given Gazprom exclusive 
right to use the pipelines for the export of natural gas to Europe.
4 Given its market share, 
this implies Gazprom has some market power in Europe
.5 
                                                 
2 See Aslund (2008) for a similar view. Aslund also suggests liquefied natural gas projects for the European 
Union.  
3 See British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Petroleum, various years.  Russia’s  proved reserves 
are down from 47.6 trillion cubic meters and more than 30% of the world’s proved reserves in 2001; 
production is up from 2001 production of 542 billion cubic meters.   
4 Gazprom paid 685 billion rubles to the Russian government in taxes in 2008. At an average exchange rate 
of 25 rubles to the dollar for 2008, this was $27 billion. See http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru/?id=12#c337. 
Nemtsov and Milov (2008) argue, however, that due to gross inefficiency of Gazprom, Russia would be 
much better served with a state monopoly on exports, but competitive purchases by the state monopoly 
among competitive producers in Russia. 
5   The largest importers of Russian natural gas are Germany (36 BCM), Italy, (25 BCM) and Turkey (24 
BCM). The next largest importers are Poland, Hungary, France and the Czech Republic, all of whom 
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 Russian domestic consumption in 2008 of 420 BCM was 2.7 times Russia’s sales 
in Europe. The key point is that to sell significantly more of its gas in Europe, Gazprom 
would have to accept a lower price, i.e., it faces a downward sloping demand curve. This 
means that there is no “world price” of gas that Russia faces. In this situation, it is 
optimal for Gazprom to set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs on exports to 
exploit this market power, which implies its price will exceed its long run marginal costs.  
Tarr and Thomson (2003) estimated that uniform pricing of Russian natural gas 
would be extremely costly to Russia.
6 If Gazprom were to sell its gas in Europe at long 
run marginal costs (including transportation costs), its lost profits would equal about two 
percent of Russian GDP. 
 
III. Russia’s Domestic Gas Market 
  
  Gazprom had a virtual monopoly on domestic gas sales for many years after 
independence, but the price of gas sales in Russia is regulated by the Federal Tariff 
Service of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Gazprom controls the gas pipeline within 
Russia. Legally, “Third Party Access” to the pipelines is granted in Russian law to 
Russia’s independent gas producers (who are both vertically integrated oil companies and 
                                                                                                                                                 
imported about 7-9 BCM in 2008. The other principal suppliers of gas to the European market are Algeria 
(through a pipeline across the Mediterranean), Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. See British Petroleum 
(2009)  
6 Although the data have changed since 2001, the principles remain the same. In 2001, Gazprom sold its 
gas in Europe at between $79 and $99 per thousand cubic meters plus $27 transportation costs. Gazprom 
president Alexei Miller reported on March 14, 2008 that "the price [of Russian gas] in Europe now exceeds 
$370. We believe the average price in 2008 could be $378 and could even reach $400 per 1,000 cubic 
meters."  Regarding demand in Russia, he noted that the rise of national industries, such as producers of 
cement, building materials, and fertilizers and gas refineries, is also pushing up Russian gas demands.  
Miller said that Gazprom plans to introduce market gas prices for Russian industrial consumers in 2011. 
See Johnson’s Russia List, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-56-39.cfm. 
In 2009, however, the price collapsed to an estimated $280 for 2009.  Moreover, Gazprom  in its zeal to 
control natural gas sales to Europe, entered into long term contracts with central Asian suppliers 
Uzbekistan and  Turkmenistan. Gazprom reportedly is paying $340 per thousand cubic meters to 
Uzbekistan in 2009. But in 2009, due to a decline in world demand,  Gazprom  has been forced to close 
down its own wells that produce gas at much lower costs than it pays to central Asian suppliers. Gazprom  
has acknowledged losses on central Asian purchases in 2009, but argues they will be profitable contracts in 
the long term.. See “Falling Gas Prices Deny Russia a Lever of Power,” New York Times, May 15, 2009. 
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/16/world/europe/16gazprom.html. 
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 specialized gas companies). In fact, independent gas producers frequently complain about 
their access.
7 Nonetheless, the share of the Russian market captured by independent gas 
producers in Russia has grown steadily since 2002, and reached an estimated 12-15 
percent of the Russian market in 2008.
8 Moreover, independent gas producers control 
about 30 percent of the natural gas reserves.  
  Gazprom, however, while not a monopoly in Russia’s domestic market, is clearly 
a very dominant firm with considerable monopoly power. Until more effective 
competition is introduced into the Russian market, efficient regulation requires 
constraining the exercise of that monopoly power by allowing price to be equal to long 
run marginal costs. While domestic natural gas prices in Russia were only $15-$20 per 
thousand cubic meters, by 2007 they had had increased to between $64 and $72.
9 I 
estimate (see Tarr, 2010) that with the substantial increase in the price of natural gas to 
producers in Russia, prices were equal to or above long run marginal costs in 2007.  
Moreover, with its decree #333 in May 2007, the Government of Russia announced plans 
to increase the price of natural gas to industrial users to international levels by 2011, less 
transportation costs and export taxes. In early 2008, prices on exports to Europe were 
about $378 per TCM. With transportation costs of about $35 per TCM and export taxes at 
30 percent, to implement this plan today, prices in Russia would have to rise to about 
$225 per TCM.  Thus, Russian domestic market prices would have to rise increase more 
than three times from their levels in 2007. These high prices would induce very 
significant inefficient reductions in Russian demand, since the value to Russian 
consumers would be considerably greater than the long run marginal costs of production. 
Russia fought a bitter battle at the WTO and won the right to have dual pricing of natural 
gas. However, except for the 30 percent export tax difference and the transportation fees, 
Russian announced plans call for it to unify natural gas prices for its industrial users. 
                                                 
7 See Baranov ( 2008) and  “Deputy Prime Minister Instructs Gazprom to Ease Pipeline Access for Russian 
Gas Producers,” Global Insight, July 7, 2008. www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail13190.htm.  
8 The largest independent seller of natural gas in Russia is the specialized gas company Novatek, followed 
by Rosneft. Other important independent sellers are Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz,  TNK-BP and the Itera Group. 
See “Gazprom is Not the Only Player in the Russian Fields,” Oil and Gas—Eurasia. August 2008. 
http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/80/articles/684 
 
9 Estimates based on Rosstat and Ministry of Economy data. According to Gazprom, in 2008, the average 
price excluding VAT and excise taxes was 1653 rubles per MCM, or about $66  per MCM at 25 rubles to 
the dollar.  See http://old.gazprom.ru/documents/Background_09.06.09.pdf 
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IV. Restructuring of the Natural Gas Industry in Russia 
  Why is Russia planning to allow domestic prices of natural gas to rise to such 
high apparently inefficient levels? Two insiders, Nemtsov and Milov (2008), have argued 
that Gazprom is an inefficient company and that Russian consumers and taxpayers are 
being forced to pay for that inefficiency. As Russia’s existing gas fields are being 
exhausted, a significant portion of the newer discoveries are available in more difficult 
places that require greater investment costs. The World Bank (2010) estimates that 
Gazprom would have to invest $15 billion per year to maintain production levels and $20 
billion per year to meet projected demand increases. But between 2001 and 2008, 
Gazprom has invested a total of only $36 billion in gas exploration and development. 
Nemtsov and Milov explain that Gazprom has failed to develop the key gas fields.  For 
example, the gas deposits of the Yamal peninsula region, with an estimated $200 billion 
in required investment costs, remain undeveloped. Gazprom’s production has remained 
stagnant since 2003, and it has made up the gap between its supplies and demand by ever 
increasing purchases from central Asia. But these purchases are coming at increased 
costs. In 2008, the presidents of the gas companies of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan announced that Gazprom would have to pay prices tied to European levels 
beginning in 2009.  
  The Russian domestic market would be best served if Russia were to fully 
introduce competition. Competition in Russian gas would be best accomplished by 
breaking up the production and distribution segments of Gazprom into separate 
independent companies and effectively enforce third party access to the pipelines. The 
pipelines could be operated as regulated monopolies. Licenses that Gazprom has failed to 
use to develop gas fields under the terms of the licenses could be provided to independent 
companies. This would result in significant additional production, and competition 
among the producers will hold down the costs of natural gas in Russia.   
  If the additional Russian producers were allowed to export natural gas, 
competition among Russian firms would erode Russian monopoly profits on European 
sales. That is, unconstrained access to export markets would result in unified pricing 
through structural reform of the Russian market. In the absence of the Gazprom 
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 monopoly, however, in order to extract the available monopoly profits on its exports of 
gas to Europe, it would be in Russia’s interest to impose export taxes on Russian gas 
exporters or to use a state trading monopoly as a marketing arm of Russian natural gas 
exports. Compared with the Gazprom monopoly, such a system would result in higher 
profits for Russia as a whole, since gas would then come from the most efficient Russian 
supplier. 
 
V.  Energy Diversification for Europe 
Diversification of Russian Supplies 
  If additional Russian producers were allowed to compete and export natural gas, 
in order to extract the available monopoly profits on its exports of gas to Europe,
10  it 
would be in Russia’s interest to impose export taxes on Russian gas exporters or to use a 
state trading monopoly as a marketing arm of Russian natural gas exports. A more 
promising avenue for European energy diversification is new pipeline construction to 
open up new sources of supply independent of Russia, and liquefied natural gas 
purchases.
11 
   Several new pipelines are proposed or under construction between Russia, central 
Asia and Europe. The most important are: Nord Stream, South Stream, Nabucco and the 
Trans-Caspian pipelines. Since the former two traverse Russia, they do not offer energy 
diversification for Europe; Russia already supplies central Asian gas to Europe through 
its pipelines based on contracts with central Asian suppliers.  The latter two offer real 
diversification of natural gas supplies.  
Nord Stream.  Russia and Germany agreed to construct the “Nord Stream” project 
through the Baltic Sea to Germany at an estimated cost of construction of $15 billion. EU 
officials forecast a beginning to the construction in 2010.
12  The alternate project is a 
                                                 
10 Some press reports have indicated that Russia agreed to limit its export taxes as part of its bilateral 
agreement on WTO accession with the EU.   
11 For example, Qatargas and Polish gas monopoly PGNiG signed an agreement in which PGNiG will 
import the equivalent of 1.5 BCM annually of liquefied natural gas from 2014 to 2034. Poland’s 
consumption in 2008 was 13.9 BCM. PGNiG will construct a regasification terminal in time for the 
deliveries. 
12 See “Nord Stream Gas Pipeline on right track,” Euractiv.com, March 11, 2009. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/official-nord-stream-gas-pipeline-right-track/article-180127.  Smith 
(2008) estimates that the costs would have been only $2.8 billion for an alternate pipeline—an enlargement 
of the Yamal pipeline that runs through Poland. 
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 second pipeline adjacent to the existing Yamal-Europe route at a cost of about $2.5 
billion. The considerably higher transportation tariffs of the Nord Stream project will 
allow the gas to by-pass Belarus and Poland, which is seen as an advantage from Russia’s 
perspective. But it must traverse either the Finnish or Estonian seabed and then the 
Swedish seabed before reaching Germany, so other intermediary countries remain 
involved in the transportation route.  
South Stream. On May 15, 2009, the gas companies of Russia, Italy, Bulgaria, 
Serbia and Greece signed an agreement on construction of the South Stream pipeline with 
a capacity of about 30 BCM per year   The pipeline would travel from Russia through the 
Black Sea and through Bulgaria. Although the exact route is not finally determined, the 
Southwestern portion should travel through Greece and the Ionian Sea to Italy, while the 
Northwestern portion would travel through Serbia and Hungary to Austria. The estimated 
cost of construction of the pipeline is about $20 billion.  
From Russia’s perspective, the idea is to by-pass Ukraine and Turkey, but the existing 
pipeline through Ukraine transports 130 BCM, so Ukraine will retain its dominant 
position. Moreover, maritime rights with either Urkaine or Turkey will have to be agreed, 
thereby negating a least part of the key advantage of this project from Russia’s 
perspective. 
Nabucco.  The Nabucco pipeline is a planned natural gas pipeline from Erzurum, 
Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary to a major natural gas hub at Baumgarten 
an der March, Austria. It is a partnership of five companies, with one company from each 
of the five countries through which the pipeline runs. Construction is expected to begin in 
2010 and be completed in 2014. It is a significant part of the European strategy for 
diversification of energy sources. The initial source of natural gas for the pipeline would 
be gas from Azerbaijan through existing pipelines that link Azerbaijan gas to Turkey. 
There are estimates, however, that Azeri gas supplies are inadequate to justify 
construction of the pipeline, so additional supplies are sought. Turkmenistan is expected 
to feed the pipeline also, either through pipelines in Iran or through the proposed 
complicated Trans-Caspian pipeline across the Caspian Sea. If the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline were constructed, Kazakhstan could also become a supplier to the pipeline. 
Egypt and Iraq could supply the pipeline through the Arab Gas Pipeline. Finally, Iran 
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 could also supply the pipeline, but this is opposed politically by the European Union and 
the United States.
13  
Trans-Caspian Pipeline. The proposed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline would run 
under the Caspian Sea from Türkmenbaşy in Turkmenistan to the Sangachal Terminal in 
Baku Azerbaijan. From Baku it would connect with the existing South Caucusus pipeline 
through Tbilisi to Erzurum in Turkey, where in turn it would be connected to the 
Nabucco pipeline, thus taking natural gas from Turkmenistan to Central Europe. 
According to some proposals it would also include a connection from the Tengiz field in 
Kazakhstan to Türkmenbaşy. Thus, the Trans-Caspian pipeline would link Turkmen and 
possibly Kazakh gas with central Europe through a route independent of both Russia and 
Iran. The estimated construction cost is $5 billion. 
In 2008, a German and Austrian company set up a joint venture named the 
Caspian Energy Company, to carry out exploration for a gas pipeline across the Caspian 
Sea that would feed into the Nabucco pipeline. Based on exploration outcomes the 
company plans to build and operate a gas transport system across the Caspian Sea .Both 
Russia and Iran, however, oppose the Trans-Caspian pipeline project and have objected 
on environmental grounds. Both nations maintain that any pipeline built under the 
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